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DEFAMATORY SPEECH ON THE INTERNET:
"DISH" BEST SERVED CHILLED?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Legislatures have set a glacial pace in applying established First
Amendment principles to speech on the Internet.I Still, in the absence of
constitutionally permissible legislative action2 dictating the respective
rights and responsibilities of on-line service providers, their subscribers,
and the public, the Internet's thorny issues-electronic copyright,3
1. See Jose I. Rojas, The Internet and Content Control: Liability of Creators,
Distributors and End-Users, in 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW: THE
EVOLVING LAW OF THE INTERNET-COMMERCE, FREE SPEECH, SECURITY, OBSENITY AND
ENTERTAINMENT, at 206 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. G4-3987, 1997); see also Alexander Gigante, Ice Patch on
the Information Superhighway: Foreign Liabilityfor Domestically Created Content, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 523 (1996) ("Until recently, the Internet was a legal
backwater."); Matthew Goldstein, Computer Communications Systems Raise Knotty
Defamation Problems, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3, 1994, at 1 ("[C]omputer-savvy attorneys..
. say that libel law has failed to keep pace with the technological revolution, leaving a
void in the definition of the duty of care owed by a commercial computer network...
to an individual defamed on one of these ... services.").
2. The Federal Communications Commission does not regulate Internet services.
See In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commissioner's Rules and Regulations, Final
Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980). Fifteen years after the Federal Communications
Commission passed the Internet hot-potato, Sen. Jim Exon of Nebraska picked it up,
introducing the Communications Decency Act of 1995 in a thwarted attempt to regulate
"obscene" computer transmissions. See S. 314, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995); see also
David L. Sobel, The Next Big FBI Lie, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 76. However, Exon's
proposed Act proved to be the bill that would not die; President Clinton signed it into
law on February 8, 1996. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 609 (1996)); Title V of the Telecommunications Act,
the Communications Decency Act, is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)-(h). Enforcement
of the Act was promptly enjoined on constitutional grounds by a three-judge panel of the
United Stated District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on June 11, 1996.
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). On March 19, 1997, the Supreme
Court heard oral arguments of the appeal. A transcript of the oral arguments is available
at http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/sctran.html. As of June 16, 1997, the Court's
decision in Reno v. ACLU was pending. For a discussion of proposed Internet copyright
legislation, see Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 135.
3. See generallyPaul Jaskunas, Tasini v. The New York Times: All the News That's
Fit to Download, AM. LAw. CORP. COUNS. MAG. INTELL. PROP. SUPP., Sept. 1995, at
14; Wendy R. Leibowitz, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom: Cyberliability:How
Far Can the (Inter) Net Be Cast?, AM. LAW. CORP. COUNS. MAG. INTELL. PROP.
SUPP., Sept. 1995, at 20; Vera Titunik, Who's Minding the On-Line Store?, AM. LAW.
CORP. COUNs. MAG. INTELL. PROP. SUPP., Sept. 1995, at 25.
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defamatory and libelous speech,4 ubiquitous jurisdiction5 and forum

shopping,6 trademark infringement and unfair competition, 7 and prior
restraints on speech-are inching toward the courthouse for resolution.

Thus, the delicate task of fashioning a standard of liability for defamatory
speech on the Internet has fallen to the courts. In the absence of guiding
precedent specific to this exploding technology,9 judges have drawn
analogies and made inferential leaps-and landed on opposite sides of the
fence.
Because of the myriad functions of the Internet, neither its content
providers, or the Internet itself, can properly be characterized exclusively
as publisher, distributor, or conduit of speech. Thus, the standard of
liability for defamatory speech on the Internet should not be determined
by analogies drawn between the Internet and long-standing First
Amendment entities such as newspapers and libraries, but rather by
4. See Goldstein, supra note 1; Matthew Goldstein, Libel an Issue for Computer
Bulletin Board, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 6, 1994, at 1.
5. Arizona federal district court ruled that publication on the Internet can establish
personal jurisdiction. Edias Software Int'l L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp 413,
420 (D. Ariz. 1996) ("BASIS' e-mail messages to Arizona and CompuServe Web site
which reaches Arizona customers count as an additional 'contacts' under a minimum
contacts analysis, but additionally confer jurisdiction in Arizona under the 'effects
test.'"); see also California Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp
1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
6. See Carl Middlehurst et al., Collection of Articles by Carl Middlehurst of Sun
Microsystems, Inc., in 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW: THE EVOLVING
LAW

OF

THE INTERNET-COMMERCE,

FREE SPEECH, SECURITY, OBSENITY

AND

ENTERTAINMENT, at 566-67 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. G4-3987, 1997); Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, OnLine Legal Issues, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 15, 1995, at 3.
7. See Middlehurst et al., supra note 6.
8. The on-line service provider, Prodigy, for example, employs a software screening
program to detect and intercept "offensive" language before it can be posted onto a
bulletin board. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., No. 94-031063, 1995
WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). Such service provider censorship is
constitutionally permissible. See Giorgio Bovenzi, Liabilities of System Operatorson
the Internet, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 117-18 (1996). ("Since the First Amendment
protects citizens only against actions of government, [an on-line service provider] can
censor users without violating the First Amendment.").
9. Although pundits and prognosticators may extrapolate the Supreme Court's
position on Internet speech from their bewildering plurality decision in Denver Area
Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996), and in particular,
Justice Souter's concurring opinion, see id. at 2401-02, Denver Area deals with cable
television, not the Internet. DenverArea's references to the Internet are dicta, rendering
the outcome of the Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU, well, unpredictable.
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analysis of the relationship between the Internet and the particular speech
at issue. Examination of two ground-breaking cases, Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc.," and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co.," for their treatment of bulletin board or "newsletter" postings
expose the extent to which a court's seemingly innocuous analogy
selection can shape its decisionmaking. Scrutiny of these cases will
demonstrate that the distributor model and independent contractor analyses
of Cubby are flawed, and that Prodigy's analysis of the liability of on-line
service providers for bulletin board postings results in a more reasonable
outcome. Viewing the Internet's relationship to this type of speech
through the prism of three criteria-genre, nature of the speech, and the
expectations of the public, 12 suggests that the producers of such speech
have a duty to be factually accurate. This note will demonstrate that such
a duty need not unduly restrict the flow of information on the Internet
because the very nature of the Internet suggests its own solutions: a
Sullivan 3 standard of liability regardless of the plaintiff's status as a
public or private figure; the equitable remedy of reply or retraction
postings; and cyberspace alternative dispute resolution.
II. Two ROUTES TO ON-LINE LIABILITY
In the area of libel law, there are two primary theories through which
liability can attach to an on-line service provider for the contents of
speech: publication and respondeat superior.4 The publication theory
asserts that on-line services act as publishers of the material they carry,
as opposed to distributors or passive conduits of information. The
10. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
11. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710.

12. This three-pronged analysis is borrowed from DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL
THE LAWYERS? SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL APPEAL 151-55 (1994).
13. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The phrase "Sullivan
standard" refers to the requirement of "actual malice," that is, for a public official to
prevail in a defamation action against a media defendant, the public official must show
that the defendant had knowledge of the falsity of the statement at issue or acted with
reckless disregard for whether the statement was true or false. See id. at 279-83. The
Supreme Court expanded the application of the Sullivan standard to cover public figures

in Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); see also Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (expanding the application of the Sullivan standard to torts
such as the negligent infliction of emotional distress); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 345-51 (1974) (defining the concept of "public figure" with more precision).

14. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139, 143. Plaintiff Cubby, Inc., employed, albeit
unsuccessfully, both theories in an attempt to hold CompuServe liable for the contents
of a newsletter carried on its Journalism Forum. See id. at 135, 138.
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distinction is significant. "[O]ne who repeats or otherwise republishes
defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published
it."5 On the other hand, distributors, such as bookstores, are liable only
when they know or have reason to know of a defamatory statement and
fail to act. 6 This knowledge requirement reflects one of the legion of
dilemmas of pluralism: The tentative balance struck by the courts between
an individual's right to protect his or her reputation, and constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Without a
knowledge requirement, distributors would be strictly liable for
disseminating defamatory speech. Distributors would be constructively
required to inspect the material they sell, thus chilling speech by
constricting the flow of information. 17 In contrast, passive conduits of
information, such as telephone companies, enjoy "relative immunity from
liability in defamation cases ... in part because [telephone companies are]
subject to federal regulation." 8
Through the doctrine of respondeat superior, vicarious liability for
information carried on-line can attach to the on-line service provider if the
creator of the information is an agent of the provider, as opposed to an
independent contractor. 9 The agency relationship is characterized by the
principal's direction and control over the agent during the employment,
whereas an independent contractor is autonomous during the employment
and is answerable to the employer as to the result of the work, rather than
his or her methods of work.' Employers can be held liable for the acts
of independent contractors, but only where the employer directed or took
part in the act that resulted in the injury. 2
III. CHOICE OF ANALOGY, CHOICE OF LAW
Stare decisis proceeds by a process of linguistic mitosis; similar facts
grow the law like Jack's beanstalk, while distinguished facts set
parameters or branch the law in a divergent direction with new
concomitant standards. The interested parties to the Internet speech debate
15.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

578 (1977).

16. See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984).
17. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (reasoning that "the
bookseller's burden would become the public's burden, for by restricting him the public's
access to reading matter would be restricted").
18. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 7.
19. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 142.
20. See id. at 142-43; see also In re Shulman Transp. Enter., Inc., 744 F.2d 293
(2d Cir. 1984); Dorkin v. American Express Co., 345 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
21. Ramos v. State, 312 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (App. Div. 1970).
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are attempting to graft the nagging First Amendment issues to various
branches of First Amendment jurisprudence to control their outcome.
Resolving the standard of liability issue depends upon whether an on-line
service provider is a publisher, a conduit, a common carrier, or a
distributor, which in turn depends upon the analogy employed. Choice of
analogy amounts to choice of law; how the Internet and the on-line service
providers are characterized dictates the reasoning employed, and thus, the
determination of the applicable standard of liability. There is no shortage
of possibilities. The Internet is a net, a web, a highway, cyberspace, a
model anarchist community, the Wild West, a bookstore, a library, a

newsstand-and although the Internet and its multitude of applications may
be simultaneously suited to all the foregoing comparisons and more, 2 for
the purposes of a given case, the on-line service provider is characterized
in a way that is most expedient for the court.'
IV. JUDGE LEISURE'S LIBRARY

Inchoate Internet libel law jurisprudence was shaped by Southern
District Court of New York Judge Peter K. Leisure's 1991 decision in
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.24
Judge Leisure held that
22. Edwin Diamond of the NYU School of Journalism, author of WHITE HOUSE TO
YOUR HOUSE (1995), referred to the Internet as an "amalgamation of trash talk" on
Straight Forward,hosted by Roger Ailes (CNBC television cablecast, Nov. 25, 1995).
23. And perhaps, what is expedient for the burgeoning on-line service industry. For
a discussion of how economic interests may have a finger on the scales of justice in First
Amendment cases, see Gerry L. Spence, The Sale of the FirstAmendment, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1989, at 52.
24. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The case concerns CompuServe's
"Journalism Forum," which carries Rumorville USA (Rumorville), a daily newsletter
"about broadcast journalism and journalists." Id. at 137. Rumorville is "published" by
Don Fitzpatrick Associates (DFA).
DFA provides Rumorville to Cameron
Communications, Inc. (CCI), the contractor that provides the Journalism Forum to
CompuServe pursuant to the "editorial and technical standards and conventions of style"
set by CompuServe. Id. Plaintiffs developed Skuttlebut, a competing database "designed
to publish and distribute . . . news and gossip in the television news and radio
industries." Id. at 138. Plaintiffs claim that in April 1990:
Rumorville published false and defamatory statements [on the Internet] relating
to Skuttlebut and Blanchard... includ[ing] a suggestion that individuals at
Skuttlebut gained access to information first published by Rumorville 'through
some back door;' a statement that Blanchard was 'bounced' from his previous
employer, WABC; and a description of Skuttlebut as a 'new start-up scam.'
Id. Plaintiffs Cubby, Inc. and Robert Blanchard brought a diversity action against
CompuServe and Don Fitzpatrick under New York law for "libel of Blanchard, business
disparagement of Skuttlebut, and unfair competition as to Skuttlebut, based largely upon
the allegedly defamatory statements contained in Rumorville." Id.
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CompuServe 2 was more like a distributor than a publisher of the
material carried on its "Journalism Forum" and granted CompuServe's
Judge Leisure employed the
motion for summary judgment. 2
appropriate "distributor" analogies in his reasoning:
CompuServe's CIS [the on-line general information service]
product is in essence an electronic, for-profit library that carries
a vast number of publications ....
...CompuServe has no more editorial control... than does
a public library, bookstore, or newsstand, and it would be no
more feasible for CompuServe to examine every publication it
carries for potentially defamatory statements than it would be for
any other distributor to do so.
The analogy chosen, the motion was decided.
On the issue of the applicable standard of liability, Judge Leisure
invoked the First Amendment by citing Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co.:
"First Amendment guarantees have long been recognized as protecting
distributors of publications. . . . Obviously, the national distributor of
hundreds of periodicals has no duty to monitor each issue of every
periodical it distributes. Such a rule would be an impermissible burden
on the First Amendment."' Judge Leisure continued:
A computerized database . . . is the functional equivalent of a
more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of
a lower standard of liability to ... CompuServe than that which
is applied to a public library, book store, or newsstand would
impose an undue burden on the free flow of information. Given
the relevant First Amendment considerations, the appropriate
standard of liability . . . is whether [CompuServe] knew or had
reason to know of the allegedly defamatory ... statements.29
The analogy chosen, the standard of liability was set.
25. CompuServe is a company which provides computer services ranging from online information databases to electronic bulletin board ."forums," which include both
read-only databases and postings, as well as interactive discussion groups.
26. CompuServe moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that "it acted
as a distributor, and not a publisher, of the statements, and cannot be held liable for the
statements because it did not know and had no reason to know of the statements."
Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 138.
27. Id. at 140.
28. Id. (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984)).
29. Id. at 140-41.

19971

DEFAMATORY SPEECH ON THE IATERNET

Judge Leisure's reasoning is, at first glance, simple induction:
CompuServe is an electronic library; libraries are distributors; therefore,
CompuServe is a distributor. However, his approach is tainted by the
logical fallacy petitio principii, in which a "premise is assumed to be true
without warrant or in which what is to be proved is implicitly taken for
granted."3" Simply, if one sets out to argue that CompuServe is a
distributor by asserting that CompuServe is the functional equivalent of a
library, foreclosing other models from the outset, the result is a circular
argument that pulls itself up by its own bootstraps.
V. DECONSTRUCTING CUBBY, INC. V. COMPUSERVE INC.

A.

A Dubious Distributor

The law may be a seamless web, but the absence of seams does not
preclude the presence of holes. In other words, reasoning by analogy can
be treacherous.
The Cubby reasoning overlooks several important
distinctions between the traditional news vendor and on-line service
provider. The most crucial distinction is that traditional vendors are not
active participants in the creation of the material they distribute.
CompuServe Inc. contracted with Cameron Communications Inc. (CCI)
to provide and control the Journalism Forum "in accordance with editorial
and technical standards and conventions of style as established by
CompuServe" 3 for CompuServe's CompuServe Information Service
(CIS), an on-line service carrying over 150 such fora, available to
subscribers that pay membership and usage fees to CompuServe. CCI in
turn contracted with Don Fitzpatrick Associates (DFA) to provide
Rumorville, a daily newsletter, for the Journalism Forum.32 Public
libraries do not contract with Random House to fill their shelves, nor does
every newsstafid feature newspapers uniquely published for them.
All on-line material is not created equal. Although it is a cogent
argument that "[i]f an individual can obtain information from a book in a
library, that same information should not be treated differently when found
on a computer bulletin board,"33 the material at issue in Cubby could not
be obtained elsewhere. Just as an author with a manuscript does not have
a book until a publishing house contracts to print it, the information
collected by DFA for Rumorville is not a newsletter without CompuServe.
30. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1690 (Philip Babcock
Gove, Ph.D. ed. 1981).
31. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 143.
32. See id. at 137.
33. Donna A. Gallagher, FreeSpeech on the Line: Modern Technology and the First

Amendment, CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS, Summer 1995, at 197, 205.
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Unlike material in information databases originally published in other
media (for example, Time, Newsweek, The New York Times), Rumorville
and like material are, in a sense, commissioned for the on-line
environment and without it, they would not exist.'
Analogies to
television broadcasting are better suited to the facts of Cubby than
comparisons to public libraries; Rumorville is more Gilligan'sIsland than
Robinson Crusoe. 5 If bookstores cease to carry the works of Defoe,
Robinson Crusoe would not cease to be available-readers could go to the
library or order Robinson Crusoe from a book club. If a mere distributor
is not the raison d'8tre of the material it distributes, then CompuServe is
no mere distributor of Rumorville.
Further, all on-line services are not created equal. Judge Leisure
hearkens back to 1987's Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co. 6 for authority that
newfangled and "technologically interesting" computer databases are
"entitled to the same protection as more established means of news
distribution." 3 7 However, the database at issue in Dow Jones is
fundamentally different than the Journalism Forum in Cubby. Information
traditionally transmitted via telegraphic ticker is not editorialized; it is
mechanically reported. Thus, the numerical transmissions have the
potential to be incorrect, but not defamatory, because they have no point
of view. Rather, they carry the disinterested vital signs of the stock
market, unencumbered by the opinions, motives, and biases of an author.
Judge Leisure fails to acknowledge that unlike the service in Dow
Jones, CompuServe functions on many levels, carrying distinct varieties
of speech: various non-interactive information databases that carry
copyrighted material from print sources such as books, magazines, and
newspapers; non-interactive newsletters, magazines, and bulletin board
postings only available on-line; interactive bulletin boards where
subscribers may post material; and interactive "chat" between subscribers.
The provenance of interactive material may be difficult to ascertain
34. Judge Leisure's distributor analysis is more suited to print magazines that are

reproduced on-line. CompuServe users can access over 200 popular print periodicals.
See Julius J. Marke, Protection of Electronic Publication Rights, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17,

1995, at 5. CompuServe charges $1.50 for each article a user calls to its screen. See
id. A given magazine contracts with Information Access Company (IAC), to sell the
right to incorporate its material into IAC's database in exchange for 30% of the net
revenues from royalties paid by on-line services to IAC. See id. The print publisher
retains the copyright and indemnifies IAC and the on-line services. See id. This
arrangement fails to pay royalties to the writers of such articles, hence, the Internet
copyright controversy. See Jaskunas, supra note 3, at 14-15.
35. DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE (1719).
36. 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
37. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140 (quoting Dow Jones, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 340).
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because the authors are anonymous, having identified themselves using
only a pseudonym or identification number to log on to the service.38

Subscribers may also have many different accounts with an on-line

service.3 9 The user of an account number -isnot necessarily the
Under the distributor analysis, unless one can show by
subscriber.'
clear and convincing evidence that the computer service provider (or any
of its intermediary de jure agents) had actual knowledge 41 or reason to
have knowledge of defamatory or libelous postings of anonymous

"authors," then a claim against them would not survive a motion for

summary judgment. 2
Ordinarily, the standard does not block all legal avenues. For
example, although printers43 and traditional distributors are not liable for
the contents of material distributed unless they knew or had reason to
know about the presence of libelous or defamatory statements, 44 in
traditional distribution settings, the identity of the publisher and author,
38. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641-44
(1995).
39. See Don Steinberg, Inside the Noisy World of Online Chat, VIRTUAL CITY,
Winter 1996, at 34, 37.
40. See generally id. at 35-42.
41. But just what constitutes knowledge? Is notification to an on-line provider that
a bulletin board contains false and defamatory statements enough to create liability, or
at a minimum, to cause the statements to be removed, or is a judicial decree required?
The on-line service industry is lobbying for the judicial decree standard, which
incidentally torpedoes the "avalanche of litigation" argument employed in the
distributor/publisher conflict. See Titunik, supra note 3, at 32. Apparently, on-line
providers are not troubled by the contradiction of claiming to have the interests of
judicial economy at heart in arguing to absolve themselves of liability, while
simultaneously insisting that a judicial finding that a statement is libelous or defamatory
be rendered before an on-line service be required to remove the offending material. See
id. at 32-34.
42. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
43. See Misut v. Mooney, 475 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (dismissing libel
claim against printer in absence of evidence of knowledge on the part of the printer).
44. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (striking ordinance imposing
criminal liability on booksellers for possession of obscene material regardless of
knowledge); see also Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("New York courts have long held that vendors and distributors of
defamatory publications are not liable if they neither know nor have reason to know of
the defamation.").
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who are liable,4' is apparent. Even when the author is anonymous it is
relatively simple to determine the publisher of a newspaper column,
magazine article, or book. Untangling the contractual relationships in
Cubby to find a publisher is not so simple. 46 The relative ease of
anonymous on-line "publishing" highlights Cubby's paradoxical outcome:
if an author cannot be ascertained, and an on-line service presumptively
escapes liability as a "distributor," then the Internet must be the exception
to Holmes's rule that for every civil wrong there is a remedy.
B. Agency Revisited
Judge Leisure accepted CompuServe's contention that "DFA is an
independent contractor of CCI and CCI is an independent contractor of
CompuServe [and that CompuServe] may not be held vicariously liable for
the statements that appeared in Rumorville." 47
"An independent
contractor is one who in exercising an independent employment, contracts
to do certain work according to his own methods, and without being
subject to the control of his employer, except as to the product or result
of his work."' Judge Leisure reasoned that CompuServe's contract with
CCI amounted to a delegation of control "over the assembly of the
contents of the Journalism Forum," 49 and that CompuServe's "ultimate
right under the contract to remove text from its system for noncompliance
with its standards merely constitute[d] control over the result of CCI's
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). Liability for defamation and
libel are informed by the status of the defendant, the subject matter, and the plaintiff.
Different standards apply depending upon whether the plaintiff is a public figure, whether
the subject matter is newsworthy or of public interest and concern, and whether the
defendant is a media defendant. For a discussion of the watershed case, New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), its progeny, and the impact of the actual malice
standard, see SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY,
AND MORAL RIGHT 215-373 (1993).
46. See supranotes 24, 31-32 and infra notes 47, 49-50, 52 and accompanying text.
47. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

48. Dorkin v. American Express Co., 345 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
American Express was not held liable for injuries sustained by a tourist when a tour bus
braked suddenly, because the European bus company was an independent contractor (as
opposed to an agent) of American Express's travel service. Seeid. American Express's
independent contractor status stemmed from the fact that American Express did not
exercise any control over the operation of the bus, the bus's route, or the type of bus;
rather, American Express was interested only in the end result: the entire tour package.
See id.
49. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 143.
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independent work. " '
Thus, Judge Leisure found that an agency
relationship between CCI and CompuServe did not exist because CCI did
not act subject to CompuServe's direction and control.5
A close reading of the decision suggests that Judge Leisure's
conclusion as to agency owes more to bootstrapping than substance.
Judge Leisure notes that the contract between CCI and CompuServe
contained "provisions calling for CompuServe to provide CCI with
training necessary to manage the Journalism Forum and to indemnify CCI
from claims resulting from information appearing in the Journalism
Forum." 5 2 Defamation actions certainly would be "claims resulting from
information appearing in the Journalism Forum."53 CompuServe's
indemnification of CCI is inconsistent with CompuServe's position that
they had no liability for the contents of the Journalism Forum. Contracts
reflect the intentions of the parties. If CompuServe intended CCI to be
solely responsible for the contents of the Journalism Forum, presumably,
the contract would have reflected that intention. Why would CompuServe
indemnify CCI for the contents of a forum over which CompuServe
exercised no control?
CompuServe effectively absolved CCI of
responsibility for the contents of the Journalism Forum, and the most
reasonable interpretation of that action is that CompuServe acknowledged,
and intended to exercise, some measure of control over those contents.
Further, because CompuServe had to provide training to enable CCI
to manage the Journalism Forum, CCI was not "exercising an independent
employment."'
It is unreasonable to find an independent contractor
relationship where the putative independent contractor lacks the expertise
to provide services contracted for without training provided by the
principal. CCI was not prepared to perform according "to [its] own
50. Id.
51. See In re Shulman Transp. Enter., Inc., 744 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 1984).
52. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 143.

53. Id.
54. Dorkin v. American Express Co., 345 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (Sup. Ct. 1973). In
Dorkin, American Express's tour contract explicitly disclaimed all responsibility or

liability for personal injury to persons who purchased their tour package. See id. The
Dorkin court found that "the provision to that effect in the tour contract is ample

evidence of the absence of any intent of American Express to assume a specific duty by
contract with respect to the safety of the tour members." Id. In contrast, in Cubby,

CompuServe's contract explicitly indemnified CCI for the contents of the Journalism
Forum. 776 F. Supp. at 143. Cubby's indemnification provision, like Dorkin's
disclaimer, is evidence of the drafter's intent regarding the duty or liability. See Dorkin,

345 N.Y.S.2d at 894.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

methods,"' 5 rather, it was literally "act[ing] subject to the principal's
direction,"" an unmistakable indicium of an agency relationship.
CCI's contract with DFA "provides that 'DFA accepts total
responsibility for the contents of Rumorville."1 7 CCI is thus insulated
from liability from both directions. Although the contract between CCI
and DFA contains the requisite talismanic language to render DFA liable
for the contents of Rumorville, s it does not follow that "Rumorville is
published by [DFA] . " 9 DFA's self-imposed responsibility for the
contents of Rumorville, in an agreement between CCI and DFA, does not
amount to indemnity of CompuServe against third party claims for
publishing Rumorville. Further, such a warranty is not legally dispositive
of liability. For example, contracts between novelists and publishers, and
screenwriters and film producers or television broadcasters customarily
include indemnification clauses and warranties that a work does not
infringe on third party rights.'
Yet, this industry practice does not
preclude lawsuits against publishers6' and broadcasters, 62 nor is it
dispositive of those lawsuits. Likewise, DFA's warranty does not evince
Judge Leisure's assertion that "Rumorville is published by DFA."63
Judge Leisure also employed the editorial filter argument, noting that
"CompuServe has no opportunity to review Rumorville's contents before
DFA uploads it into CompuServe's computer banks, from which it is
immediately available to . . . subscribers." I However, in live news
reporting, the network broadcaster similarly delegates control to the
reporter and has no ability to review spontaneous language, yet that does
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Dorkin, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
In re Shulman, 744 F.2d at 295.
Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 143.
"The contract between CCI and DFA provides that DFA 'accepts total

responsibility for the contents' of Rumorville." Id. at 137.
59. Id.
60. See generally MARK

LITWAK, CONTRACTS FOR THE FILM AND TELEVISION

INDUSTRY (1994).

61. For examples of libel and defamation cases involving defendant publishers, see
Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980); Bindrum v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr.
29 (Ct. App. 1979); Springer v. Viking Press, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1982),
aff'd 60 N.Y.2d 916 (1983); Welch v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., N.Y. L.J., Apr. 12,
1991, at 25 (N.Y. App. Term 1991).
62. See Gordon v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 76 Civ. 2894 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);

Taylor v. American Broad. Co., Inc., 82 Civ. 6977 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). These cases were
settled before any issues were decided by the court.
63. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137.

64. Id.
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not dissolve the agency relationship between the reporter and employer.
In fact, one of the largest libel awards ever affirmed by a federal court of
appeals was against a television station for remarks made by a news
anchor.65
VI. JUSTICE AIN'S NEWSPAPER

Justice Smart L. Ain handed down the "first [decision] to find [that]
a computer network can be more than a passive conduit of information"'
in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.67 Plaintiff Stratton
Oakmont, a Long Island brokerage firm, represented by a lawyer who had
handled several of their securities cases but who remarkably "had no prior
experience as a First Amendment litigator and had little personal
knowledge of the computer industry," 6 8 prevailed on both issues of its
partial summary judgment motion. Justice Ain agreed with Stratton's
position that Prodigy was a publisher, not a distributor of the newsletter
"Money Talk," and that the "board leader" of Money Talk was an agent
of Prodigy.69
Justice Ain's ruling carried far-reaching implications for the on-line
service industry when it was handed down in May of 1995, but currently
Prodigy is a lame duck. Prodigy lacks the precedential weight of Cubby
because in a remarkable reversal, Stratton dropped its $200 million lawsuit
65. See Alex S. Jones, News Media'sLibel Costs Rising, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1991, at A28. A news anchor for Chicago's WBBM-TV, a CBS-owned
station, "suggested that Viceroy cigarettes had developed advertisements intended to
attract minors to smoking." Id. The tobacco company was awarded $1 million in
compensatory damages and $2.05 million in punitive damages. See id.
66. Today's News: Update, N.Y. L.J., Jun. 19, 1995, at 1.
67. No. 94-031063, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). The case
concerns Prodigy's "Money Talk" bulletin board. Allegedly defamatory statements were
posted on Money Talk, including: that Stratton Oakmont, a securities firm, and its
president, Daniel Porush, committed criminal and fraudulent acts; that an offering of
Solomon-Page stock (by Stratton) was "major criminal fraud" and "100% criminal
fraud"; that Stratton was "a cult of brokers who either lie for a living or get fired"; and
that Porush was "soon to be proven criminal." Id. at *1. The statements were "posted
anonymously using the log-on identification number of a former Prodigy employee,
allegedly remain[ing] on the bulletin board for 19 days." Matthew Goldstein, On-Line
Service Held in Libel Suit, EditorialControl Cited in State Ruling, N.Y. L.J., May 26,
1995, at 1. Stratton sought summary judgment on two issues: whether Prodigy was a
publisher of the statements at issue, and whether the "Board Leader," of Money Talk
was an agent of Prodigy. See id. at 1.
68. Matthew Goldstein, LitigatorHits Big Time With ProdigyLibel Win, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 31, 1995, at 1.
69. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
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in exchange for an apology, 70 and "agreed not to oppose Prodigy's7
request that Justice Ain set aside, or overturn, his earlier decision." 1
Continuation of the suit posed additional risks of defamation to Stratton.
Prodigy had asserted that it "would be able, if necessary, to show that the
statements accusing Stratton Oakmont of fraud were true." 72 In 1994,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ordered Stratton to "pay
$2.5 million [without admitting wrongdoing] as part of an investigation
into alleged stock manipulation."'
Stratton's settlement "effectively
ended the legal discovery process that could have entered the confidential
SEC report into the public record."7 4 At the close of 1995, Justice Ain
refused to overturn Prodigy.75
Where Judge Leisure employed "distributor" analogies, Justice Ain
employed "publisher" analogies, using Prodigy's own statements against
them:
We make no apology for pursuing a value system that reflects
the culture of the millions of the American families we aspire to
serve. Certainly no responsible newspaper does less when it
chooses the type of advertising it publishes, the letters it prints,
the degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors
tolerate. 76
Justice Ain reasoned that the "distribution" model in Cubby was
inapplicable because the Prodigy facts were distinguished: Prodigy had
held itself out to be a family-orientated service, thereby suggesting
editorial control of the material it carried. 7 To that end, "Prodigy uses
a special computer program to screen out messages that contain obscene
or offensive language and has declined to include sexually-explicit bulletin
70. See Peter H. Lewis, After Apology from Prodigy, Investment Firm Drops Suit,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1995, at D1.

71. Id.
72. Matthew Goldstein, Parties Seek End to On-Line Defamation Lawsuit, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 25, 1995, at 1.

73. Id.at 1.
74. Lewis, supra note 70.
75. See Today's News: Update, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 14, 1995, at 1.

76. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 94-031063, 1995 WL
323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).

77. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, On-Line Services andDefamation, N.Y.
L.J., July 11, 1995, at 3.
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boards or discussion groups."78 Counsel for Prodigy "had urged Justice
Ain to reconsider his decision . . [because] Prodigy was merely editing
its computer bulletin boards for taste and not content. "79
Justice Ain took great pains to distinguish Prodigy from Cubby. Yet,
the facts of Cubby and Prodigy present distinctions without a difference.
The gravamen of the Prodigy analysis is editorial control. However,
CompuServe exerted much the same editorial control.' Had the Prodigy
"publisher" analysis been applied to Cubby, the probable outcome would
have been different. In future decisions, this must be recognized,
otherwise Cubby will petrify into an anomalous obstacle to be maneuvered
around by judges confronted with on-line libel actions. When Justice Ain
found that Prodigy "was not protected by the Cubby decision because
unlike CompuServe, it does exercise considerable editorial control over its
bulletin boards . . . [but] accepted Cubby as controlling on the standard
of liability for computer networks that eschew the role of editor,"8" his
analysis was based on Judge Leisure's cursory analysis of CompuServe's
role. Because Prodigy does not indicate how much content regulation is
required to transform a passive conduit into a publisher, Justice Ain's
decision may have the undesirable effect of encouraging on-line service
providers to "eschew" creating any guidelines whatsoever for their
services, lest they invite liability. Such an outcome "may transform the
Internet into a fertile ground for defamation and libel."'
Further, the facts of the agency relationship issue in Cubby and
Prodigy are more alike than distinguishable. In both cases there are
contracts with written guidelines setting out the performance expected by
the on-line service provider from the offeree; s both cases involve
training and guidance by the on-line service provider to enable the offeree
to perform;'M and both agreements contain language intended to preclude
78. Goldstein, supra note 4. For an entertaining, albeit politically incorrect,
description of how Prodigy's screening process functions during interactive chat, see
HoWARD

STERN,

Miss AMERICA 15-20 (1995).

79. Goldstein, supra note 72. Perhaps Prodigy's had at long last established an

accounting for taste.
80. See supra notes 24, 31 and accompanying text.
81. Goldstein, supra note 67.
82. Raysman & Brown, supra note 6.
83. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., No. 94-031063, 1995 WL
323710, at *2, 5-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); cf Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 143, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing CompuServe's directive).
84. See Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *5-7; cf. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 143
(discussing CompuServe's training provision).
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the finding of an employee relationship. ' The different outcome of the
agency issue in Prodigy is accounted for not because the facts are
distinguished, but because Justice Ain was willing to look past the
language of the agreement to find the substance of the agreement.
VII. CAVEAT SUBSCRIBER?

If on-line service providers are publishers of bulletin board
newsletters, the question remains: Just what measure of truth does one
have a right to reasonably expect from an on-line newsletter? Should
every statement found on-line be approached with a "subscriber beware"
attitude? Analysis of three criteria: genre, nature of the posting, and
expectations of the subscriber, point to an answer.
First, the genre of the speech should be considered. 6 In the case of
the on-line bulletin boards at issue in Cubby and Prodigy, the appropriate
genre is non-fiction. True, monikers like Rumorville and Skuttlebut do not
conjure up visions of Edward R. Murrow, but nonetheless, Rumorville is,
ironically, part of CompuServe's Journalism Forum. In substance,
Rumorville was carrying an expos6 of Skuttlebut, a competing
newsletter.'
Indeed, in context of CompuServe's relationship to
Rumorville, the court refers to CompuServe as a "news distributor. "88
Prodigy's Money Talk bulletin board, "allegedly the leading and most
widely read financial computer bulletin board in the United States, where
members can post statements regarding stocks, investments and other
financial matters" 9 is likewise news. News is a non-fiction genre that
unambiguously implies fact.
Second, the nature of the posting informs the question of an author's
(or publisher's) duty to the facts.' In print news, the tension might be
between the tabloid press and the mainstream press. In cyberspace, the
tension is between interactive and passive news. Generally, passive news
has a better reputation for accuracy. 9 Interactive news sites on the
85. See Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *5-7; cf. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137, 143
(discussing CompuServe's indemnification).

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See KORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 152.
See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 138.
Id. at 141.
Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
See KORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 153.
See Dante Ramos, News, Weather, Sports: Get the Truth You Want When You

Want It, VIRTUAL CITY, Winter 1996, at 60, 63.
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Internet are reported to be full with "hearsay and lies,"' while "the
" 93
worthwhile online news sources are barely interactive at all.
"[C]omputer users seem to agree" that there is reason to have
"suspicions" about the veracity of a news item to the degree that on-line
news is interactive. 94
Third, the subscriber or viewer's expectation should be considered. 5
In the case of the postings at issue in Cubby and Prodigy, a subscriber
could reasonably expect facts, as well as opinions. Certainly a subscriber
who turns to Money Talk for investment guidance understands that an
investment's past performance does not necessarily indicate future
performance.
But a statement that an investment firm committed
securities fraud is not mere opinion, especially when the subscriber
understands that such a posting is subject to "content guidelines" and
oversight by "Board Leaders."96 Likewise, a CompuServe subscriber
could reasonably expect a non-interactive daily newsletter that appears in
a forum dedicated to journalism to adhere to the most rudimentary tenets
of journalism: check the facts and do not publish lies. The interplay of
these three criteria as they apply to the facts of Cubby and Prodigy suggest
that truth is not an unreasonable expectation.
VIII. CYBERSULLIVAN
If on-line service providers are publishers of bulletin boards, and truth
is not an unreasonable expectation, what standard of liability should apply?
The Internet's inherent, unique, uncomplicated democratic access suggests
two corollaries: a Sullivan standard for damages stemming from on-line
speech is appropriate for all plaintiffs regardless of status and dispute
resolution methods such as retraction or right of reply from the publishers
of the offending material, 97 and no-damages, no-fault libel suits98 are
eminently applicable to on-line libel suits.
92. dat60. "Follow the newsgroupalt.news.aol.sucks, for example, and you learn
that America Online has purchased The Wall Street Journal." 1d.
93. Id. at 63. The most common source for such non-interactive news is Reuters.
See id. at 62.
94. Id. at 64.
95. See KORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 154.
96. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, at *2.
97. A similar "retraction" proposal by the Libel Reform Project of Northwestern
University's Annenberg Washington Program was defended by Rodney Smolla. See
Rodney Smolla, Reform Libel Law? Yes, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 42.
98. See Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in
its ProperPlace, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1287, 1288 (1988).
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American libel law underwent a sea-change in 1964 with the Supreme
Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'
Sullivan
essentially shifted the burden from the media defendant (to prove the truth
of a statement) to the plaintiff (to prove both that the statement was false
and that the defendant either knew that the statement was false, or
recklessly disregarded whether the statement was true or false)." This
shift does not impose an impermissible burden upon Sullivan plaintiffs
because, by definition, they are public officials or public figures, and are
presumed to have access to the media'0' to defend themselves. Private
individuals have no such access. Courts continue to be "mindful of the
potential predicament of a private individual who feels defamed . . .
[w]ithout any access to a public audience, the individual may be left with
false assertions and innuendoes."102 The Internet, however, is not an
exclusive media. The ease of access allows any individual to repair his
or her reputation much in the same way public figures can defend
themselves through the print and broadcast media. Such equal access
undercuts the damage of on-line defamatory speech and justifies the
Sullivan standard for all plaintiffs who seek money damages.
Acceptance of the "publisher" model and application of the Sullivan
standard for money damages in on-line libel suits would not cause a
financial hemorrhage. The Sullivan standard is difficult to satisfy, and
where it is applied, relatively few damages awards are upheld on
appeal."0 3 Currently, the brunt of the Sullivan standard is not brought
to bear upon private figure plaintiffs unless the plaintiff is seeking
presumed or punitive damages and the speech at issue is a matter of public
concern.1 4 Dun and Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders"5 permits
lower standards of liability (such as negligence) with its holding that in the
case of a media defendant and private plaintiff, where the speech does not
involve matters of public concern, state law controls the imposition of
presumed and punitive damages." ° Even these "lesser" standards for
private individuals have not closed the marketplace of ideas. The Internet
99. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
100. See Leval, supra note 98, at 1287.
101.
102.
23, 1995,
103.
104.
105.

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Bill Alden, 'Village Voice' ClearedofLibelfor IsraelArticle, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
at 1 (quoting Chaiken v. VV Publ'g Corp., 91 Civ. 2102 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
See Leval, supra note 98, at 1287.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-48 (1974).
472 U.S. 749 (1985).

106. See id. at 753, 761. However, the contours of "matter of public concern" are

open to debate. Arguably, anything a media defendant publishes can qualify. See id.
at 782 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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would surely survive the application of the Sullivan standard for
defamatory speech." °
Alternative means of dispute resolution are well adapted to the
Internet.' 03 For example, the right of reply could be exercised with
minimal delay, great ease, at the same Internet site that carried the
offending material, and for the same duration as the offending material
was posted. The right of reply is constitutionally acceptable."°9 On-line
service providers such as Prodigy and America Online have expressed
A
support for right of reply as a remedy in defamation cases. 1
publisher cannot be compelled to print a particular point of view."'
However, right of reply statutes merely require that the parties attempt to
settle their differences with a retraction or reply before litigating." 2 The
parties are not compelled to agree. Yet until courts can move beyond the
publisher/distributor controversy, these methods of resolution will not be
fully exploited. For example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals overturned
a lower court ruling in a defamation action that included a computer
bulletin board within the meaning of "periodical" under Wisconsin's right
of reply statute."'
IX. CONCLUSION
On-line speech should be analyzed in light of its relationship to the
service provider, not by rigidly labeling the provider. Indicia of
distributed speech include whether the speech originally appeared in
107. Furthermore, in the absence of clearly delineated and widely accepted customs
of trade, proving Sullivan's reckless disregard would be difficult. However, if notice to
a publisher that speech was allegedly libelous went ignored, the reckless disregard
standard would probably be satisfied. See Karen S. Frank, Potential Liability on the
Internet, in CABLE ACT LAw 1996, at 446-49 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks &
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3962, 1996).
108. In addition to right of reply, the "no-money, no-fault" libel suit, an option not
fully addressed in this paper, is a remedy well suited to Internet libel actions. See Leval,
supra note 98, at 1287-1302.
109. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969).
110. See Branscomb, supra note 38, at 1671-72.
111. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
112. See It's in the Cards v. Meneau, 535 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
113. See id.; cf. Stem v. Delphi Internet Serv. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct.
1995) In Stern, the on-line service provider contended that it was a news disseminator
when faced with a suit for commercial misappropriation of a likeness of Howard Stem
brought under N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW §§ 50-51. Delphi, asserting that it was a news
disseminator, was seeking the shelter of the newswortiness exception to the application
of N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51.
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another medium, whether the speech is exclusive to the service provider,
and whether the subscriber incurs additional cost for access to the speech,
apart from membership and timed usage charges. However, where noninteractive speech is original to an on-line service, or where the creation
of material is contracted for by the on-line service provider, such speech
is published by the on-line service because but for the on-line service
provider the speech would not exist. In the case of interactive speech,
liability should be determined on a case-by-case basis, and the crucial
inquiries should be whether the on-line service promoted or practiced
policies of content regulation or editorial control, and the response of the
service provider when allegations of libel arise. Prodigy is the prototype
of this analysis. Reasonable responses on the part of the on-line service
should compromise such claims, avoiding the undesirable effect of
encouraging and rewarding abdication of all editorial control on the part
of service providers.
Defamatory speech is not protected speech.
False, injurious
statements should be remedied, on-line or not. However, libel law gives
an individual rights they do not have to exercise. Arguments asserting
that if libel law is applied to the "limitless" amount of speech on the
Internet, the result will be limitless litigation and the demise of the
Internet are unavailing. Every word on the pages contained in the Library
of Congress, broadcast on television, and uttered on a street corner is
regulable. Yet the publishing houses have not closed for fear of litigation,
televisions have not gone dark, nor has interpersonal communication been
chilled silent. On-line service providers are exploiting the consternation
of a legal system confronted with the task of incorporating yet another
new technology into the system of laws." 4 American jurisprudence has
managed to survive the advent of radio, telephones, network television,
and cable television. It will survive the Internet. Understandably, the
lucrative on-line industry will seek to avoid liability as long as possible.
Constitutionally sound legislation is needed, but for better or worse, in its
absence, the responsibility of sorting out on-line liability has fallen to the
courts." 5 If punishable speech is chilled speech, then the Court has

114. For definitive scholarship on the convergence of the First Amendment and new
technologies, see generally Owen Fiss, In Search of a New Paradigm, 104 YALE L.J.
1613 (1995); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging FirstAmendment
Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719 (1995);
Lawrence Lessig, The Pathof Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein,
The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757 (1995); Eugene Volokh,
Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
115. Although the Communications Decency Act apparently addresses the liability
of on-line service providers in section 509(c)(1), which provides, "No provider or user
of interactive computer services shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
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determined unequivocally that defamatory speech is best served chilled.

Defamatory speech on-line is no exception.
Fia F. Porter

information provided by another information content provider," the provision does not
immunize on-line service providers as distributors, which can be liable if the Sullivan
standard for actual malice is satisfied. Rojas, supra note 1, at 212-14; see also Martin
C. Loesch, Recent Developments in Self-Insurance and Risk Management, 32 TORT &
INS. L.J. 583, 589 (1997) ("The [Communications Decency] Act preempts inconsistent
state law. Thus, it appears that the rule of Cubby prevails at present; however, we can
expect courts to continue to be active in the area." (citation omitted)).

